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What is the impact of time-varying business uncertainty on economic activity? Using partly confidential
business survey data from the U.S. and Germany in structural VARs, we find that positive innovations
to business uncertainty lead to prolonged declines in economic activity. In contrast, their high-frequency
impact is small. We find no evidence of the "wait-and-see"-effect – large declines of economic activity
on impact and subsequent fast rebounds – that the recent literature associates with positive uncertainty
shocks. Rather, positive innovations to business uncertainty have effects similar to negative business
confidence innovations. Once we control for their low-frequency effect, we find little statistically or
economically significant impact of uncertainty innovations on activity. We argue that high uncertainty
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What is the impact of time-varying business uncertainty on economic activity? Real options
theory associates innovations to uncertainty with a “wait-and-see”effect: if ﬁrms suddenly ﬁnd
themselves in a more uncertain environment they stop investing and hiring and the economy
slips into a recession. This “wait-and-see”-effect has recently attracted attention in the liter-
ature: Bloom (2009) and Bloom et al. (2009) use a quantitative RBC model with various ad-
justment frictions to capital and labor to argue that positive innovations to uncertainty lead to
short-run ﬂuctuations, starting with a rapid decline in aggregate activity, then a rebound phase
and a prolonged overshoot after approximately six months.1 Prima facie, uncertainty shocks
haveappealingproperties, chieﬂyamongthemthatnotechnologicalregressisrequiredtogen-
erate recessions. All that is needed are autonomous increases in business uncertainty.
Bachmann and Bayer (2009), exploring data from a detailed German ﬁrm-level panel, argue
that the effects in Bloom (2009) and Bloom et al. (2009) are quantitatively small and do not sub-
stantially alter unconditional business cycle dynamics. This is conﬁrmed in Chugh (2009), who
explains the dynamics of leverage with innovations to micro-level uncertainty, but also ﬁnds
a small business cycle impact of uncertainty shocks. Using a model with ﬁnancial frictions,
Gilchrist, SimandZakrajsek(2009)arguethatincreasesinuncertaintyleadtoanincreaseinthe
cost of capital through an increase in bond premia which is followed by a decline in investment
activity. In a similar framework Arellano et al. (2010) show that increases in uncertainty lead to
downsizing of investment projects to avoid default.2 These papers employ mostly quantitative
models and calibration exercises to study the impact of time-varying uncertainty on economic
activity. What is missing from the literature are more agnostic studies of the economic effects
of innovations in uncertainty.3
In this paper we use partly conﬁdential monthly data from business surveys to investigate
the relationship between uncertainty and economic activity within a structural vector autore-
gressions (SVAR) approach. We conﬁrm the sceptical results in Bachmann and Bayer (2009)
and Chugh (2009) without relying too strongly on a speciﬁc model and calibration. These busi-
ness surveys contain qualitative information on the current state of, and expectations regard-
1Figure2inSection2providestheimpulseresponseofoutputtoanuncertaintyshockfromthemodelinBloom
(2009). The three phases – activity collapse, rebound and overshoot – can be clearly seen in this graph.
2In a related, but slightly different context, Fernandez-Villaverde et al. (2009) argue that innovations to the
volatility of interest rates depress economic activity in small open Latin American economies.
3The two exceptions we know of are: Alexopolous and Cohen (2009) who use a narrative approach in a struc-
turalVARframework(theincidenceofthewords“uncertainty”and“economy”inNewYorkTimesarticles)andﬁnd
high-frequency decline-rebound-overshoot dynamics; and Popescu and Smets (2009) who show, again with struc-
tural vector autoregressions and for German data, that it is innovations to risk aversion rather than innovations to
uncertainty per se that explain roughly 10%-15% of output ﬂuctuations.
2ing, ﬁrms’ business situations. Speciﬁcally, we use disagreement in business expectations for
the Third FED District Business Outlook Survey (BOS) to estimate the impact of business un-
certainty on economic activity.4 We also take seriously the potential criticisms against using
aggregate disagreement measures as proxies of uncertainty. The German IFO Business Climate
Survey (IFO-BCS) data allow us to do so. In particular, we use the conﬁdential micro data of the
survey to compare the disagreement-based measure of uncertainty with a qualitative index of
the forecast error variance of production expectations. We ﬁnd that the two uncertainty mea-
sures are positively correlated and that their impact on economic activity is qualitatively and
quantitatively similar and statistically often indistinguishable. This justiﬁes our use of survey
disagreement as a proxy for uncertainty when micro data are unavailable.
We argue that these high-frequency business survey data are well suited to measure the
direct impact of uncertainty on economic decision making. As discussed in the next section,
“wait-and-see”-dynamics are rather short-run and rely on adjustment frictions, which render
high-frequency data the best candidate to detect these dynamics. Aggregate business survey
data are also readily available. All this puts qualitative survey data in an advantage over quan-
titative balance sheet data. Business survey data in particular capture the subjective element of
uncertainty, viz the mind set of actual decision makers, as opposed to outside experts. Also, the
conﬁdential survey micro data allow us to compare expectations and realizations of economic
variables and thus – as is the case with the IFO-BCS data – construct two complementary prox-
ies of true ex ante uncertainty: ex ante disagreement and ex post forecast error variance.
We consistently ﬁnd that in two-variable SVARs innovations to uncertainty have very pro-
tracted negative effects on economic activity. The effect on impact, in contrast, is small. This is
documented inFigure 1, where we show inthe lower panel an impulse responsefroma positive
innovation to a measure of business uncertainty from the BOS on U.S. manufacturing indus-
trial production. For comparison, the upper panel shows the impulse response from a negative
innovation to a business conﬁdence measure on the same activity variable. They look very sim-
ilar. This is a robust ﬁnding across speciﬁcations and surveys.
We then impose more structure in the identiﬁcation and add measures of business uncer-
tainty to a VAR with sectoral economic activity and the aggregate unemployment rate in the
spirit of Blanchard and Quah (1989). Consistent with the implications of “wait-and-see”, we
identifytheuncertaintyshockasashockwhichdoesnotinﬂuenceeconomicactivityinthelong
run but which may inﬂuence both activity and unemployment on impact. We thus “shut down”
thelong-runimpactofuncertaintyinthehopeofmakingitsshort-runinﬂuenceshinethrough.
4Using dispersion indexes of expectations as measures of uncertainty has a long tradition in the literature
(mostly in the context of inﬂation expectations and inﬂation uncertainty): see, for instance, Zarnovitz and Lam-
bros (1987), Bomberger (1996), Giordano and Soederlind (2003), Fuss and Vermeulen (2004) for a good literature
overview, Bloom et al. (2009) and Popescu and Smets (2009).
3Figure 1: Conﬁdence and Uncertainty Innovations on Manufacturing Production



















Notes: Both IRFs are based on the "general business conditions" question of the BOS. Conf idencet ´
Fract(Increase) ¡ Fract(Decrease) and Uncertaintyt ´ sqrt(Fract(Increase) Å Fract(Decrease) ¡
(Fract(Increase) ¡ Fract(Decrease))2), where Fract(Increase) is the fraction of respondents that say that
general business conditions six months from time t will increase. Fract(Decrease) is deﬁned analogously. The
upper panel shows the response of manufacturing production to a negative conﬁdence innovation in a two-
variable SVAR with Conf idence ordered ﬁrst. The lower panel shows the response of manufacturing production
to a positive uncertainty innovation in a two-variable SVAR with Uncertainty ordered ﬁrst. Manufacturing
production is the natural logarithm of the (seasonally adjusted) monthly manufacturing production index
from the OECD main economic indicators. All VARs are run with 12 lags, the conﬁdence bands are at the 95%
signiﬁcance level using Kilian’s (1998) bias-corrected bootstrap.
We ﬁnd that there is little statistically or economically signiﬁcant impact of uncertainty shocks
on economic activity left. Rather, we provide some evidence that negative long-run shocks give
riseto higheruncertainty, whichleadsus to interprethighuncertainty eventsasa mere epiphe-
nomenon of bad economic times. We interpret this in light of the view of recessions as times of
destroyed relationships and practices, the reestablishment of which generates uncertainty for
businesses.
The next section discusses the wait-and-see mechanism and delivers a benchmark against
which we compare our empirical results. The third section describes the business survey data
weuse. Thefourthsectionpresentsthemainresultsandinterpretsthem. Detailsandadditional
results are relegated to various appendices.
42 Uncertainty and Activity: “Wait-and-See”
In this section we give a brief overview of the “wait-and-see”mechanism that might give rise
to uncertainty-driven ﬂuctuations.5 In addition to providing a benchmark against which we
can compare our empirical results, this exercise will also serve to motivate the use of high-
frequency, sectoral data in examining the impact of uncertainty on economic activity.
Figure 2: Replication of Wait-and-See in Bloom (2009)











Uncertainty Innovation on Output
Notes: this graph is a replication of the simulated model IRF of out to an uncertainty shock, see Figure 12 in Bloom
(2009). The overshoot reaches its peak after roughly one year, and, as Figure 9 in Bloom (2009) shows, needs two
more years to settle down.
Time-varying uncertainty at the ﬁrm level may have economic consequences when there is
adegreeofirreversibilitytoﬁrmactions. Foraconcreteexample,supposethataﬁrmfacesﬁxed
costs to adjusting the size of its labor force and/or physical capital stock. Suppose further that
there is a mean-preserving spread on the distribution of future demand for the ﬁrm’s product.
With ﬁxed adjustments costs, higher uncertainty over future demand makes new hiring and
investment less attractive. The reason for this is intuitive – if a large ﬁxed cost must be paid
5The literature has highlighted other mechanisms, such as countercyclical default risk in the presence of ﬁ-
nancial frictions, for instance Arellano et al. (2010), Gilchrist, Sim and Zakrajsek (2009) and Gilchrist, Yankov and
Zakrajsek (2009). While default risk is related to ﬁrm-level uncertainty, the two concepts of uncertainty are differ-
ent.
5to adjust the ﬁrm’s labor or capital, then there is reason to minimize the number of times this
cost must be paid. If the future is very uncertain (in the sense that demand could be either
very high or very low relative to the present), then it makes sense to wait until the uncertainty is
resolvedtoundertakenewhiringandinvestment. Whypayalargeﬁxedcostnowwhenahighly
uncertain future means that one will likely have to pay the ﬁxed cost again?6
An increase in uncertainty thus makes inaction relatively more attractive. Given a reduction
inhiring,employment,andhenceoutput,willfallthroughexogenousseparations. Asthefuture
begins to unfold, demand or productivity conditions are, in expectation, unchanged. There will
be pent up demand for labor and capital. Inaction today moves ﬁrms closer to their adjust-
ment triggers in subsequent periods, leading to expected increases in hiring, investment and a
general rebound and even overshoot in economic activity, followed by a return to steady state.
Figure 2 provides an example of an impulse response of output to an increase in uncertainty,
replicated from the model in Bloom (2009).
This theoretical impulse response highlights an important aspect as pertains to our empir-
ical work. The economic implications of uncertainty shocks in a model with “wait-and-see”-
effects are decidedly high-frequency in nature. The entire bust-boom cycle in response to in-
creased uncertainty only takes about one year to play out with roughly two more years to re-
vert back to steady state (see for the full impulse response Figure 9 in Bloom, 2009). Thus, an
empirical study of uncertainty that wants to detect “wait-and-see”effects should make use of
high-frequency data, which is one of the reasons why we use monthly surveys in this paper.
Anadditionaladvantageofoursurveydatafromspeciﬁcsegmentsoftheeconomy–speciﬁc
sectorsand/orregions–isthatgeneralequilibriumeffectsarelikelytobemitigated. “Wait-and-
see”is clearly a partial equilibrium mechanism, which might be dampened by general equilib-
rium price adjustments.7 For instance, if in response to an increase in uncertainty, all ﬁrms
simultaneously want to shut down hiring, wages are likely to adjust in equilibrium so that at
least some ﬁrms do continue hiring. Our focus on sector level data thus gives the “wait-and-
see”mechanism a better chance of shining through.
3 Measuring Business Uncertainty
We construct uncertainty measures from the Third FED District Business Outlook Survey (BOS)
and the German IFO Business Climate Survey (IFO-BCS).8 In the next subsection we brieﬂy de-
6The argument is equally valid with partial irreversibilities instead of ﬁxed costs.
7Note that Bloom (2009) is a partial equilibrium analysis.
8Appendix D supplements our baseline results with an analysis of the U.S. Small Business Economic Trends
Survey (SBETS).
6scribethecharacteristicsofeachandlistthemainsurveyquestionsweusetomeasurebusiness
uncertainty. We then deﬁne the variables used in the empirical analysis, followed by a subsec-
tion on the the cyclical properties of our main variables.
3.1 Data Description
3.1.1 BOS
The Business Outlook Survey is a monthly survey conducted by the Federal Reserve Bank of
Philadelphia since 1968. The survey design has essentially been unaltered since its inception.
It is sent to large manufacturing ﬁrms in the Third FED District.9 The survey questionnaire is of
the“boxcheck”variety. Itasksaboutﬁrms’generalbusinessexpectationsaswellastheirexpec-
tations and actual realizations for various ﬁrm-speciﬁc variables such as shipments, workforce
and work hours. Respondents indicate whether the value of each economic indicator has in-
creased, decreased, or stayed the same over the past month. They are also asked about their
expectations for each indicator over the next six months. Whenever possible, the survey is sent
tothesameindividualeachmonth, typicallythechiefexecutive, aﬁnancialofﬁcerorotherper-
son “in the know”. Participation is voluntary. The group of participating ﬁrms is periodically
replenished as ﬁrms drop out or a need arises to make the panel more representative of the
industrial mix of the region. Each month 100-125 ﬁrms respond. As noted by Trebin (1998),
occasional telephone interviews are used to verify the accuracy of the survey responses.
The advantages of the BOS are its long time horizon, its focus on one consistent, econom-
ically relatively homogenous class of entities – large manufacturing ﬁrms10 –, an unparalleled
number of questions that are useful for our research question and the fact that for each ques-
tion there is a "current change" and an "expectation" version. Its main drawback is the rela-
tively small number of respondents.11 Nevertheless, given its advantages, we use the BOS for
our baseline results. We focus on the following two questions:12
Q 1 “General Business Conditions: What is your evaluation of the level of general business activ-
ity six months from now vs. [CURRENT MONTH]: decrease, no change, increase?”
9The Third Federal Reserve District comprises the state of Delaware, the southern half of New Jersey, and the
eastern two thirds of Pennsylvania.
10There is a concern that if adjustment costs grow less than proportionally with ﬁrm size the ﬁrms in the BOS
may be sufﬁciently large that adjustment costs do not matter for them, and therefore “wait-and-see”cannot be
detected in the BOS. To address this issue, we complement the BOS analysis with the SBETS (see Appendix D) and
ﬁnd essentially the same results.
11This problem is alleviated in the SBETS.
12The other questions we use from the BOS are documented in Appendix B.1.
7Q 2 “General Business Conditions: What is your evaluation of the level of general business activ-
ity [LAST MONTH] vs. [CURRENT MONTH]: decrease, no change, increase?”
Both questions are phrased as if they were about general business conditions. Trebin (1998)
notes,however,thatanswerstothesequestionsarehighlycorrelatedwithresponsestotheship-
ments question, which is phrased as explicitly company speciﬁc. As such, he concludes that
both series are essentially indicators of ﬁrm-speciﬁc business conditions.
In addition, in order to construct an employment turnover indicator, we use the following
question:
Q 3 “Company Business Indicators: Number of Employees [LAST MONTH] vs.
[CURRENT MONTH]: decrease, no change, increase?”
3.1.2 IFO-BCS
The German IFO Business Climate Survey is one of the oldest and broadest monthly business
conﬁdence surveys available (see Becker and Wohlrabe (2008) for more detailed information).
However, due to longitudinal consistency problems and availability of micro data in a process-
able form only since 1980, we limit our analysis to the manufacturing sector from 1980 until the
present. From 1991 on, the sample includes East-German ﬁrms as well.
One of the IFO-BCS’s main advantages is the high number of survey participants. The aver-
age number of respondents at the beginning of our sample is approximately 5,000; towards the
end the number is about half that at 2,500.13 Participation in the survey is voluntary and there
is some fraction of ﬁrms that are only one-time participants. However, conditional on staying
two months in the survey, many ﬁrms continue on and this allows us to construct a measure
of ex post forecast error uncertainty. Our ﬁnal sample of continuing ﬁrms comprises roughly
4,000 respondents at the beginning and 2,000 towards the end of the sample. In terms of ﬁrm
size, the IFO-BCS contains all categories. In the survey for January 2009, for example, about
12% of respondents had less than 20 employees, roughly 39% had more than 20 but less than
100 employees, 43% of the participants employed between 100 and 1000 people and less than
7% possessed a workforce of more than 1000 people.
The two main questions that allow us to construct a qualitative index of ex-post forecast
errors are:14
Q 4 “Expectations for the next three months. Our domestic production activities with respect
to product XY will (without taking into account differences in the length of months or seasonal
ﬂuctuations): increase, roughly stay the same, decrease.”
13The IFO-BCS is a survey at the product level, so that these numbers do not exactly correspond to ﬁrms.
14Here we provide a translation, for the German original see Appendix C.1.
8Q 5 “Trends in the last month. Our domestic production activities with respect to product XY
have (without taking into account differences in the length of months or seasonal ﬂuctuations):
increased, roughly stayed the same, decreased.”
Since this survey is the only one where we have access to the micro data, it provides us with
an opportunity to compare ex ante uncertainty measures that are derived from cross-sectional
disagreement with a qualitative index of ex post forecast error uncertainty. We can compare




use these categories to deﬁne two forward-looking indices concerning expectations and two
indices of current activity. We start with the forward-looking indices, constructed for questions










if the Increase-category is quantiﬁed by Å1 and the Decrease-category by ¡1 and the residual
categories by 0. This is a standard quantiﬁcation method for qualitative survey data, under
whichConf idencet simplybecomesthecross-sectionalaverageofthesurveyresponses. Next,
we deﬁne a current index of economic activity for questions like Q 2 and Q 5. Summing up
variables that essentially measure changes is intended to capture a qualitative measure of the





For the question on actual employment changes, Q 3, we also construct a turnover index,
deﬁned as:
Turnovert ´Fract(Increase)ÅFract(Decrease).
93.3 Is Cross-sectional Dispersion a Good Proxy for Uncertainty?
Measuring the subjective uncertainty of decision makers is inherently difﬁcult. Ideally, one
would like to elicit a subjective probability distribution over future events from the managers,
as has been done in Guiso and Parigi (1999) for Italian ﬁrms. With this probability distribu-
tion it is straightforward to compute a measure of subjective uncertainty for ﬁrms’ decision
makers. However, to the best of our knowledge such probability distributions are not avail-
able repeatedly and over long time horizons. Therefore, researchers have to rely on proxies.
Using the cross-sectional dispersion of ﬁrms’ expectations as a proxy for ﬁrms’ uncertainty is
not without potential problems. First, time-varying cross-sectional dispersion in ﬁrms’ survey
responses might simply be due to different ﬁrms reacting differently to aggregate shocks even
with constant aggregate and idiosyncratic uncertainty. Secondly, time variation in the disper-
sion of expectations might be the result of time variation in the heterogeneity of said expec-
tations, without these expectations reﬂecting a higher degree of uncertainty on the part of the
business managers. In this subsection, we brieﬂy address these concerns, summarizing more
detailed results from various appendices.
We address the ﬁrst concern – different ﬁrms having different factor loadings to aggregate
shocks – by a variance decomposition of (UncertaintyIFO
t )2 into the average within-variance
and the between-variance of the 13 manufacturing subsectors contained in the IFO-BCS (see
Appendix C.2 for details). The idea behind this decomposition is that such differences in fac-
tor loadings to aggregate shocks might be due to industry-speciﬁc production and adjustment




ferent over the business cycle. While this is an admittedly imperfect test, because it could still
be the case that differences in factor loadings to aggregate shocks are generated by differences
in production and adjustment technologies below the level of disaggregation that we can study
with the IFO survey, these differences would have to emerge equally in all manufacturing sub-
sectors for the between-variance to have such low explanatory power for the overall variance.
We view this as highly unlikely.
To address the second concern – the relationship between (time-varying) dispersion, un-
certainty and cross-sectional shock variance – we present in Appendix A a simple and highly
stylized two-period model where ﬁrms receive signals about their uncertain future business
situations. We show for this model that if signals are neither perfectly informative nor per-
fectly uninformative, under Bayesian updating both the dispersion of ﬁrms’ expectations and
the average subjective uncertainty in the cross-section increase in response to an increase in
the cross-sectional variance of ﬁrms’ future business situations.
10The micro data in the IFO-BCS allow us to go a step further and speciﬁcally address this
concern. Weconstructaqualitativeindexoftheexpostforecasterrorstandarddeviation,which
by construction excludes heterogeneous, but certain, changes in expectations. To ﬁx ideas, we
proceed as if the production expectation question in IFO-BCS, Q 4, was asked only for the next
month instead of the following three months. In that case, when comparing the expectation in
month t with the realization in month t Å1, nine possibilities arise: the company could have
predicted an increase in production and realized one, in which case we would count this as
zero forecast error. It could have realized a no change, in which case, we would quantify the
expectation error as ¡1 and, ﬁnally, it could have realized a decrease, which counts as ¡2.
Table 1: POSSIBLE EXPECTATION ERRORS - ONE MONTH CASE
IncreasetÅ1 UnchangedtÅ1 DecreasetÅ1
Expected Increaset 0 -1 -2
ExpectedUnchangedt +1 0 -1
Expected Decreaset +2 +1 0
Notes: Rows refer to qualitative production expectations in month t. Columns refer to qualitative production
realizations in month t Å1.
Table 1 summarizes the possible expectation errors. Of course, the production expectation
question in IFO-BCS is for three months ahead. Suppose that a ﬁrm stated in month t that
its production will increase in the next three months. Suppose that in the next three months
one observes the following sequence of outcomes: production increased in t Å1, remained un-
changed in t Å2 and ﬁnally decreased in t Å3. Due to the qualitative nature of the IFO-BCS we
havetomakesomeassumptionsaboutthedeﬁnitionoftheexpectationerroratthemicrolevel.
As a baseline we adopt the following steps. First, we deﬁne for every month t a ﬁrm-speciﬁc ac-
tivity variable over the next three months, t Å3, by the sum of the Increase-instances minus
the sum of the Decrease-instances over that time period.15 Denote this variable by REALIZt.
It can obviously range from [¡3,3]. Then the expectation errors are computed as:
15We also experiment with a weighted sum approach: we weight realizations in tÅ1 one half, realizations in tÅ2
one third and realizations in t Å3 one sixth. Naturally, when asked in t about the next three months, the ﬁrm may
bias its answer towards the immediate future. None of our results depends on the precise weighting scheme.
11Table 2: POSSIBLE EXPECTATION ERRORS - THREE MONTH CASE
ExpectationerrortÅ3
Expected Increaset REALIZt È0 0
Expected Increaset REALIZt ·0 (REALIZt ¡1)/3
ExpectedUnchangedt REALIZt È0 REALIZt/3
ExpectedUnchangedt REALIZt Æ0 0
ExpectedUnchangedt REALIZt Ç0 REALIZt/3
Expected Decreaset REALIZt Ç0 0
Expected Decreaset REALIZt ¸0 (REALIZt Å1)/3
Notes: Rows refer to the qualitative production expectations in IFO-BCS in month t (Q 4).
Notice that the procedure in Table 2 is analogous to the one month case. Dividing by three
is simply a normalization. ExpectationerrortÅ3 ranges from [¡4
3, 4
3], where for instance ¡4
3
indicates a strongly negative forecast error: the company expected production to increase over
the next three months, yet every single subsequent month production actually declined.
Computingthecross-sectionalstandarddeviationsoftheexpectationerrorsateachmonth,




Notice the timing in the deﬁnition of Uncertainty
f e
t : the standard deviation of realized ex-
pectation errors in t Å3 does not constitute uncertainty in t Å3. It is the knowledge (at time t)
of this standard deviation going up or down that makes decision makers more or less uncer-
tain at time t. It should be emphasized that this timing does not require decision makers to
know anything about the future, other than that it is more or less uncertain.16 The advantage
ofUncertainty
f e
t overUncertaintyt is that it is based on actual "uncertain-at-time-t" inno-
vations, as opposed to potentially heterogeneous expectations of the future, which could be




level the correlation becomes 0.77. The fact that both conceptually different proxies for uncer-
taintyarereasonablyclosetoeachotherlendssomesupporttothewidespreadpracticeofprox-
ying uncertainty with survey disagreement. Figure 22 in Appendix C.2 depictsUncertainty
f e
t
and Uncertaintyt, both at the monthly and the quarterly frequency. Most importantly, the
impulse responses on economic activity look qualitatively and quantitatively similar and are
statistically often indistinguishable (see Section 4.3).
16We follow here Bloom’s (2009) timing convention for stock market volatility.
123.4 Cyclicality of Business Survey Variables
In this subsection, we report basic cyclical properties of the survey-based variables introduced
in Sections 3.2 and 3.3: Uncertaintyt, Uncertainty
f e
t and Activityt. They have been sea-
sonally adjusted with the SAS X12 procedure, an adaptation of the U.S. Bureau of the Census
X-12-ARIMA seasonal adjustment method. Table 3 displays the cyclical properties of the vari-
ous survey-based uncertainty measures. They are all countercyclical. This conﬁrms previous
ﬁndings by Bloom (2009), Bloom et al. (2009), Chugh (2009) and Bachmann and Bayer (2009),
who ﬁnd, using different data sources, that stock market volatility and balance-sheet-based
cross-sectional measures of uncertainty are all countercyclical.17 The discrepancy between the
ﬁrstandsecondcolumnsfortheIFOuncertaintymeasuresispartly,justasfortheothersurveys,
theresultofanimperfectrepresentationoftheentirepopulationbythesurveysample. ForGer-
many, however, we ﬁnd that the industrial production measure exhibits a lot of high-frequency
noise-like movements, which in part contributes to this low correlation. The correlation be-
comes more negative when we aggregate up to the quarterly frequency.




Uncertainty Measure IPt Activityt IPt Activityt
General Conditions-UncertaintyBOS
t -0.28 -0.47 -0.33 -0.51
Shipments-UncertaintyBOS
t -0.27 -0.29 -0.31 -0.32
Production-UncertaintyIFO





-0.05 -0.54 -0.24 -0.59
Notes: This table displays the unconditional contemporaneous correlations between the survey-based variables
in the rows and the month-over-month/quarter-over-quarter differences of two different activity measures in the
columns. Industrial production (IP) measures are logged. The General Conditions-UncertaintyBOS
t measure,
based on Q 1, is paired with the corresponding difference of the (seasonally adjusted) manufacturing industrial




sponding difference of the (seasonally adjusted) manufacturing industrial production index from the OECD main
economic indicators and the Shipments-ActivityBOS
t measure based on Q 9 (see Appendix B.1). The Production-
UncertaintyIFO
t measure, based on Q 4, is paired with the corresponding difference of the (seasonally adjusted)
manufacturing industrial production index from the German Federal Statistical Agency and the ActivityIFO
t -




, see Section 3.3; it is paired with
the same activity measures as the Production-UncertaintyIFO
t measure.
17See Table 10 in Appendix C.2 for similar results in 13 manufacturing subsectors.
13Table 4 displays the cyclical properties of the survey-based (differenced) activity measures
we constructed in Section 3.2. They are, not surprisingly, procyclical.
Table 4: CYCLICAL PROPERTIES OF Activityt
Monthly Quarterly







Notes: This table displays the unconditional contemporaneous correlations between the differenced survey-based
variables in the rows and the month-over-month/quarter-over-quarter differences of industrial production in-
dices. Industrial production (IP) measures are logged. The General Conditions-ActivityBOS
t measure, based on
Q 2, is paired with the corresponding difference of the manufacturing industrial production index from the OECD
main economic indicators. The Shipments-ActivityBOS
t measure, based on Q 9 (see Appendix B.1), is paired with
the corresponding difference of the manufacturing industrial production index from the OECD main economic
indicators. The Production-ActivityIFO
t measure, based on Q 5, is paired with the corresponding difference of
the manufacturing industrial production index from the German Federal Statistical Agency.
4 Results
In this section we present and discuss our main empirical results. We robustly ﬁnd that in-
novations to business uncertainty are associated with small and slowly-building reductions in
economic activity. Imposing the restriction that uncertainty innovations have no long-run ef-
fects on activity, which is consistent with the “wait-and-see”-hypothesis, renders the responses
of economic activity to uncertainty insigniﬁcant and often essentially zero at all horizons. This
ﬁnding is difﬁcult to reconcile with the “wait-and-see”channel from uncertainty to aggregate
dynamics.
We begin the analysis with the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia Third District Business
Outlook Survey and conclude with the German IFO Business Climate Index. In addition to
providing veriﬁcation of our main qualitative ﬁndings from data in another country, the IFO
micro data allows us to compare our SVAR results when using ex ante survey disagreement
versus the ex post forecast error standard deviation as measures of business uncertainty. We
show that they are similar using either measure as a proxy for uncertainty.
144.1 Third FED District Business Outlook Survey
We begin our analysis with the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia’s Third District Business
OutlookSurvey. Figure1intheIntroductionshowsimpulseresponsesfromtwo-variableSVARs
with U.S. manufacturing industrial production and, respectively, an innovation to business
conﬁdence and business uncertainty. The variables are ordered such that innovations to the
survey measure inﬂuence economic activity on impact but not vice versa.18 Both variables en-
ter the system in levels and we include 12 lags. 19
As noted in the Introduction, the impulse response of manufacturing production to an in-
novation to business uncertainty is slightly negative on impact with effects that build over time.
Thepeakdeclineisatabout1percent,occurringabouttwoyearsafterimpact,withnotendency
to revert. As the upper panel of the ﬁgure shows, the response of production to uncertainty is
roughly the same as its response to a negative conﬁdence innovation.
Figure 3 provides corroborating evidence with a different measure of sectoral economic ac-
tivity. In addition to the forward-looking conﬁdence question, the BOS in Q 2 asks about cur-
rent business conditions relative to the recent past. We estimate bivariate SVARs with General
Conditions-Conf idenceBOS
t and General Conditions-UncertaintyBOS
t and an activity index
based on Q 2, again with activity ordered second. The responses are strikingly similar to that
using overall manufacturing production as the activity measure. This is particularly important,
aswedonothavemonthlyindustrialproductiondatadisaggregatedattheregionalandsectoral
level that would allow us to construct a quantitative activity measure that corresponds exactly
to the BOS.20 The fact that the results are nearly identical across two related, but different activ-
ity measures lends credence to our ﬁndings.21
Two additional observations from Figure 1 in the Introduction and Figure 3 here are worth
18One might be worried that uncertainty should not affect economic activity on impact because of various in-
formation or decision lags. For instance, one might assume that companies know uncertainty only through the
published surveys themselves, when they see a lot of disagreement there. It is reasonable to assume that decision
makers at the ﬁrms care very much about the survey results and let their decision making be inﬂuenced by them,
as there is no direct ﬁnancial incentive to participate in these surveys. Figure 15 in Appendix B.3 presents the ana-
log to the lower panel of Figure 1 with economic activity ordered ﬁrst. From this graph it is clear that timing does
not drive our results.
19Our results are robust to alternative assumptions about how the variables enter the VAR (i.e. levels vs. differ-
ences) as well as to alternative assumptions about lag length. For the cases in which we use a long run restriction
to identify the uncertainty shock, the activity variable enters the VAR in ﬁrst differences and we show cumulated
impulse responses.
20Such employment data are only available from 1990 on.
21In Table 9 in Appendix B.2 we compare various BOS activity measures with the monthly Third FED district BLS
manufacturing employment data from 1990 on. We also compare the monthly BOS activity measures with the
monthly coincident index from the Philadelphia FED, which measures overall economic, not merely manufactur-
ing activity for the Third FED district. Using this index as the activity variable in the two-variable SVAR would yield
identical results. Finally, we compare yearly averages of the BOS activity measures with the yearly NIPA manu-
facturing production index for the Third FED district. The BOS activity measures are positively correlated with all
these other imperfect activity measures from ofﬁcial statistics, which shows that the BOS depicts the dynamics of
15Figure 3: Conﬁdence and Uncertainty Innovations on BOS General Conditions Activity



















Notes: Both IRFs are based on Q 1. The SVARs are estimated with 12 lags and conﬁdence/uncertainty ordered
ﬁrst. Both responses are those of General Conditions-ActivityBOS
t (based on Q 2). The upper panel is based on a
two-variable SVAR with General Conditions-Conf idenceBOS
t (negative innovation). The lower panel is based on
a two-variable SVAR with General Conditions-UncertaintyBOS
t (positive innovation). All conﬁdence bands are at
the 95% signiﬁcance level using Kilian’s (1998) bias-corrected bootstrap.
noting. First,thefactthattheGeneralConditions-Conf idenceBOS
t -variablepredictsbothman-
ufacturing industrial production and the General Conditions-ActivityBOS
t -variable well at
medium and long horizons shows that the BOS survey answers reﬂect accurate expectations
of ﬁrms about their future.22 This in turn lends credence to our expectation-based uncertainty
measures. Secondly, the prolonged negative response of economic activity to an innovation in
business uncertainty is consistent with the empirical impulse response of economic activity to
a credit shock in Gilchrist, Yankov and Zakrajsek (2009),23 and the theoretical impulse response
ofeconomicactivitytoapersistentuncertaintyshockinamodelwithﬁnancialfrictionsinArel-
lano et al. (2010).
real economic activity in the manufacturing sector of the Third FED district reasonably accurately.
22Barsky and Sims (2009) ﬁnd a similar result for consumer conﬁdence and aggregate economic activity. Fig-
ure 14 in Appendix B.2 shows the dynamic cross-correlations between BOS Conf idencet-variables and BOS
Activityt-variables and they indeed peak at medium to long horizons with conﬁdence leading.
23Figure 26 in Appendix E shows the analog to Figure 1, using readily available corporate bond spread data as
a measure of uncertainty. The impulse response of industrial production to a corporate bond spread innovation
looksverysimilartotheonewhenoursurvey-basedbusinessuncertaintymeasureisused. Incontrast,theimpulse
response to stock market volatility is rather different.
16Figure 4: Uncertainty Innovations on Manufacturing Employment



























Notes: see notes to Figure 3. Uncertainty is ordered ﬁrst. The employment measures are seasonally adjusted and
logged and are taken from the BLS-CES data base.
In Figure 4 we show impulse responses from bivariate SVARs featuring our BOS baseline
uncertainty measure and various manufacturing employment measures. The responses shown
are that of employment to uncertainty, with uncertainty ordered ﬁrst. Wait-and-see theories of
the transmission from uncertainty shocks to business cycles emphasize hiring and ﬁring fric-
tions. If the “wait-and-see”-channel were important, we would observe a large reduction in
employment followed by a quick recovery in response to an uncertainty shock, similarly to the
output response in Figure 2 in Section 2. However, the response of manufacturing employment
is rather consistent with our other results: it moves little on impact, followed by a period of sus-
tained reductions, with no obvious tendency for reversion, even at very long horizons. There is
no discernible difference for production and non-production workers, who might be subject to
different adjustment costs.24
24In Appendix B.3 we provide robustness checks to our ﬁrst result that in two-variable SVARs uncertainty inno-
vations trigger prolonged declines in economic activity. Figures 16 and 17 vary the economic activity variable used
in the baseline SVAR, while keeping General Conditions-UncertaintyBOS
t (based on Q 1) as the uncertainty mea-
sure: the BOS shipments, employment and work hours based activity indices and labor productivity. Figures 18
to20,inturn,varytheuncertaintymeasure: anindicatorvariableforhighuncertaintyinthespiritofBloom(2009),
an uncertainty measure, based on information-theoretic uncertainty (see Rich and Tracy (2006)), and uncertainty
measures derived from other expectation questions in the BOS. We also experimented with the aggregate invest-
ment rate as the activity measure, given that “wait-and-see”-theories equally stress capital adjustment frictions.
The impulse response looks essentially the same as with output and employment. However, since we do not have
sectoral investment data at at least a quarterly frequency, we do not want to over-interpret this result.
17Another direct and related prediction of the “wait-and-see”-theory is that job turnover – de-
ﬁned as the sum of job creation and job destruction – should decline following an increase in
uncertainty: wait and do nothing. Yet again, the survey data are inconsistent with this pre-
diction. Figure 5 shows the response of the extensive margin of job turnover to an innovation
in uncertainty. The point estimate on and near impact is positive and insigniﬁcant from zero,
turning more signiﬁcant at horizons well beyond one year.25
Figure 5: Uncertainty Innovation on BOS Job Turnover Index









Notes: see notes to Figure 3. The turnover variable is based on Question 3.
There are two main results from our analysis thus far – one negative and one positive. The
negative result is that there is little evidence supporting the “wait-and-see”-mechanism. On
the positive side we have that innovations to uncertainty appear to contain signiﬁcant predic-
tive information for the future path of sectoral economic activity. To explore these conclusions
further, as well as to give uncertainty a better chance of leading to high-frequency “wait-and-
see”-typedynamics,wenowattemptto“control”foranyinformationaboutlong-runeconomic
activity contained in the uncertainty measures. We do so in three exercises. First, we include
business conﬁdence in the SVAR. As noted previously, conﬁdence is informative about eco-
25Admittedly, this evidence is somewhat weak, given that the lower conﬁdence band is rather consistent with
“wait-and-see”. Nevertheless, overall we view Figure 5 as unfavorable evidence for this mechanism. Also, the
dynamic unconditional correlations between the BOS job turnover measure and the BOS uncertainty measures
are, albeit mildly, positive for the uncertainty measures leading between zero and twelve months.
18nomic activity in the long-run. Orthogonalizing uncertainty with respect to conﬁdence should
control for the long-run predictive component of uncertainty, thereby making it more likely for
the high-frequency impacts of time-varying uncertainty to shine through. Second, we adopt
an identiﬁcation approach in the spirit of Blanchard and Quah (1989): in a two-variable VAR
with an uncertainty and an activity measure, we identify the uncertainty shock as a shock that
does not impact activity in the long-run. Here the long-run impact of uncertainty, guided by
the “wait-and-see”-hypothesis, is shut down by construction. Third, we include the aggregate
unemployment rate in the Blanchard and Quah (1989)-type SVAR in order to be able to identify
amoreconventionalaggregatedemandshockseparatelyfromtheshort-rununcertaintyshock,
where we assume that the conventional demand shock does not affect uncertainty on impact.
The result in all three exercises is clear: once the long-run impact of uncertainty is “controlled”
for,thereis(almost)noeconomicallyorstatisticallysigniﬁcantimpactofuncertaintyonactivity
left.
Figure 6: Uncertainty Innovations Orthogonalized to Conﬁdence Innovations

























Notes: see notes to Figures 1 and 3. General Conditions-Conf idenceBOS
t is ordered ﬁrst, then General
Conditions-UncertaintyBOS
t , then the activity variable, manufacturing production (upper panel) and the Gen-
eral Conditions-ActivityBOS
t index (lower panel).
Figure 6 depicts impulse responses of two different measures of activity – manufacturing
production and the General Conditions-ActivityBOS
t index – to an uncertainty innovation or-
19thogonalized with respect to General Conditions-Conf idenceBOS
t . As expected, orthogonaliz-
ing with respect to a conﬁdence series lowers the quantitative magnitude of the responses of
activity to uncertainty – compare the solid lines and the dashed-dotted lines in Figure 6 – and
makes it almost statistically insigniﬁcant, but it appears to do little to change the qualitative
nature of the responses. The response of sectoral activity, however measured, to uncertainty
is small and insigniﬁcant on impact, followed by further reductions, and then some evidence
of reversion at longer horizons. Nevertheless, orthogonalizing with respect to the conﬁdence
series does not point to an important “wait-and-see”-effect.
Figure 7: A Two-Variable Blanchard-Quah-Type SVAR




























Notes: see notes to Figures 1 and 3. We use manufacturing production as the activity measure, and the General
Conditions-UncertaintyBOS
t index as the uncertainty measure. The uncertainty innovation is identiﬁed as the
shock that does not impact manufacturing production in the long-run.
Figure 7 shows the impulse responses from a two-variable SVAR with manufacturing pro-
ductionastheactivityvariable(justasinFigure1)andtheGeneralConditions-UncertaintyBOS
t
index. We identify the uncertainty shock as the one with zero long-run impact on economic ac-
tivity. Notice that the corresponding long-run shock in our case, unlike in Blanchard and Quah
(1989) who used aggregate production, need not literally be a productivity shock, as we are
dealing with sectoral activity variables. Rather, it is any shock that permanently affects sectoral
output. We ﬁnd that once uncertainty is bereft of its long-run effect, the impact of higher un-
certainty on economic activity becomes positive, but economically small. On the other hand,
20we ﬁnd a statistically signiﬁcant positive impact of a negative long-run innovation on the un-
certainty measures. This is precisely what our epiphenomenon hypothesis with respect to un-
certainty implies.
For a two-variable VAR speciﬁcation we are concerned that the short-run shock we iden-
tify as an uncertainty shock might be confounding true innovations to uncertainty and a more
conventional aggregate demand shock. Like Blanchard and Quah (1989), we therefore include
the aggregate unemployment rate in the two-variable VAR with sectoral uncertainty and busi-
ness activity measures and identify two short-run shocks using the usual long-run restriction
for each. We then identify the conventional short-run shock by ordering unemployment last.
Consistentwiththe“wait-and-see”-hypothesis, thismeansthatuncertaintycanchangetheun-
employment rate on impact.



































































Notes: see notes to Figures 1 and 3. We use manufacturing production as activity measure, and the General
Conditions-UncertaintyBOS
t index as the uncertainty measure. The unemployment rate is the (seasonally ad-
justed)monthlycivilianunemploymentratefromtheBLS.Theuncertaintyinnovationandtheconventionalshort-
runshockareidentiﬁedasshocksthatdonotimpactmanufacturingproductioninthelong-run. Theconventional
short-run shock is identiﬁed as the innovation that does not affect the uncertainty index on impact.
Figure 8 shows the impulse responses in such a three-variable SVAR, and Table 5 the corre-
sponding forecast error variance decomposition for horizons ranging from one month to ﬁve
years. Both results from the two-variable speciﬁcation – no signiﬁcant impact of uncertainty
21on economic activity and an increase of uncertainty to negative long-run innovations – “sur-
vive”.26 The forecast error variance for activity is mainly driven by the long-run and the con-
ventional short-run shock, while the contribution of the uncertainty shock after three months
drops below 10 percent. The contribution of the uncertainty shock to the ﬂuctuations of the
unemployment rate is even smaller.27 The long-run shock accounts for a signiﬁcant fraction of
the ﬂuctuations in the uncertainty index in the ﬁrst six months.
Table 5: FORECAST ERROR VARIANCE DECOMPOSITION - BOS
Shock 1M 3M 6M 1Y 2Y 5Y
Long-run 62% 55% 52% 53% 64% 77%
Activity Uncertainty 19% 10% 6% 3% 1% 1%
Short-run 20% 34% 42% 44% 34% 22%
Long-run 39% 48% 47% 28% 21% 21%
Uncertainty Uncertainty 61% 52% 51% 43% 29% 27%
Short-run 0% 0% 2% 30% 51% 52%
Long-run 0% 6% 11% 15% 21% 23%
Unemployment Rate Uncertainty 1% 1% 0% 0% 1% 2%
Short-run 99% 93% 89% 85% 77% 75%
Notes: see notes to Figure 8.
4.2 IFO Business Climate Index
WenextpresentresultsfromtheGermanIFOBusinessClimateIndex. Themainadvantagehere
is that we have access to the micro data, which allows us to compute a measure of uncertainty





the results with the ex ante disagreement uncertainty measure –UncertaintyIFO
t . The results
using either uncertainty measure are quite similar to those from the BOS. This provides cor-
roboration of the results from U.S. data. It also serves as support for our use of a disagreement
measure as an uncertainty proxy when micro data are unavailable.
Figure 9 shows the activity responses for the baseline two-variable SVARs to the two types
of uncertainty innovations we are considering. The activity variable is based on Q 5, the IFO
current production question. The SVARs here include a dummy variable from 1991 on to ac-
count for structural breaks associated with the German reuniﬁcation, though our results are
quite insensitive to alternative ways of dealing with that event. There are two important re-
sults: First, we see that the responses of activity to the two different measures of uncertainty
26If we reverse the Choleski order between the uncertainty and the conventional aggregate demand shock, i.e.
weallowthelattertohaveanimmediateimpactontheuncertaintyindex,weoftenalsoﬁnduncertaintyincreasing
to negative aggregate demand innovations, but this effect turns out to be hardly statistically signiﬁcant. The other
impulse responses are quite robust to changing the Choleski order.
27It is somewhat larger for the IFO-BCS (Table 6, next section) and the SBETS (Table 11, Appendix D).
22are quite similar to each other, in fact statistically indistinguishable. Second, the results are also





is used. The impact effects on activity are small, with the trough of
the negative response occurring roughly two years subsequent to the shock.
Figure 9: Uncertainty Innovations on Production-ActivityIFO
t
















Notes: Uncertaintyt is based on Q 4. Uncertainty
f e
t is based on Q 4 and Q 5. The activity variable is based on
Q 5. Uncertainty is ordered ﬁrst. We include a dummy variable from 1991 to account for the German reuniﬁcation.
We run the SVARs with 12 lags. All conﬁdence bands are at the 95% signiﬁcance level using Kilian’s (1998) bias-
corrected bootstrap.
WeconcludebylargelyconﬁrmingtheBOSresultsfromthethree-variableBlanchard-Quah-
type SVAR with Production-ActivityIFO
t , Uncertaintyt andUncertainty
f e
t , and the unem-
ployment rate in Figure 10 and Table 6. We ﬁnd that uncertainty measured either way has lower
impactonsectoraleconomicactivitythanintheBOSandsomewhatmoreimpactontheunem-
ployment rate, especially for the disagreement measureUncertaintyt. The impulse response
toneitheruncertaintymeasureissimilarto“wait-and-see”-dynamics. Weagainﬁndthataneg-
ative long-run shock has a sizeable positive impact on the uncertainty index. The similarity be-
tween the BOS and IFO-BCI results suggests that the negative ﬁndings in Bachmann and Bayer
(2009) as well as Popescu and Smets (2009) with regards to the role of uncertainty innovations
as a major driving force of short-run ﬂuctuations are not driven by their use of German data.











































































Notes: see notes to Figure 9. The unemployment rate is the (seasonally adjusted) monthly unemployment rate
fromtheBundesanstaltfürArbeit. Theuncertaintyinnovationandtheconventionalshort-runshockareidentiﬁed
as shocks that do not impact manufacturing production in the long-run. The conventional short-run shock is
identiﬁed as the innovation that does not affect the uncertainty index on impact.
24Table 6: FORECAST ERROR VARIANCE DECOMPOSITION - IFO-BCS




Long-run 22% 22% 32% 51% 74% 87%
Activity Uncertainty 5% 1% 2% 6% 10% 7%
Short-run 73% 77% 66% 43% 16% 6%
Long-run 28% 31% 36% 40% 45% 44%
Uncertainty Uncertainty 72% 67% 63% 59% 53% 51%
Short-run 0% 2% 2% 2% 2% 5%
Long-run 37% 35% 31% 23% 17% 33%
Unemployment Rate Uncertainty 19% 19% 21% 25% 37% 39%
Short-run 45% 45% 48% 52% 46% 28%
Uncertaintyt
Long-run 8% 8% 13% 21% 40% 73%
Activity Uncertainty 1% 5% 8% 6% 2% 1%
Short-run 91% 87% 80% 73% 58% 27%
Long-run 41% 39% 41% 52% 62% 44%
Uncertainty Uncertainty 59% 60% 49% 36% 25% 17%
Short-run 0% 1% 10% 13% 13% 39%
Long-run 44% 40% 38% 28% 14% 23%
Unemployment Rate Uncertainty 44% 45% 41% 40% 30% 23%
Short-run 12% 15% 20% 32% 56% 55%
Notes: see notes to Figure 10.
254.3 Discussion
In simple two-variable VARs with sectoral business uncertainty and economic activity vari-
ables we ﬁnd protracted negative impulse responses of activity to uncertainty innovations. Job
turnover reacts positively to the same shocks. This is inconsistent with the high-frequency
“wait-and-see”-dynamicsrecentlyadvocatedintheliterature. Imposingsomewhatmorestruc-
ture on the SVAR identiﬁcation makes the effects of sectoral business uncertainty on sectoral
economic activity essentially vanish. These results leave open two interpretations for the role
of uncertainty in economic ﬂuctuations. The ﬁrst interpretation is that uncertainty is an au-
tonomous source of such ﬂuctuations but has mainly long-run effects, similar to productivity
innovations. In this case our SVARs show that structural models using these innovations need
a mechanism that transmits rather transitory uncertainty shocks into very persistent output
declines. Alternatively, uncertaintycanbeviewedasmainlyanepiphenomenonthataccompa-
nies bad economic times.






































Notes: see notes to Figures 8 and 9. The ﬁrst and second panel are simply a replication of the ‘Uncertainty to
Long-Run’ impulse responses from these ﬁgures. The third panel displays the ‘Uncertainty to Long-Run’ response
of a three-variable Blanchard-Quah-type SVAR with ‘Corporate Bond Spread’ as the uncertainty measure, total
industrial production as the activity measure and the civilian unemployment rate. ‘Corporate Bond Spread’ refers
to the spread of the 30 year Baa corporate bond index over the 30 year treasury bond. Where the 30 year treasury
bond was missing we used the 20 year bond. Data source for the bond data is the Federal Reserve Board.
26We lean towards the second interpretation. Figure 11 shows the response of the BOS and
IFO uncertainty indices, respectively, to the identiﬁed long-run shock. We also run an analo-
gous SVAR with the 30 year corporate bond spread as the uncertainty measure. It is clear that
negative long-run innovations have signiﬁcant impact on uncertainty. In other words: bad eco-
nomic times breed uncertainty. Also, the forecast error variance decomposition in Tables 5
and 6 shows that the long-run innovations contribute signiﬁcantly to ﬂuctuations in the uncer-
tainty index.28
Wethinkofrecessionsastimesofseveredbusinessandcustomerrelationshipsandoffailing
business models. Business and customer relationships have to be reestablished and business
models altered when the economy is at trough. This generates uncertainty. In booms, in con-
trast, businesses have little incentive (or opportunity) to substantially change their operating
practices. Customers stay with their preferred business.
As a highly stylized example, suppose there are three businesses in an economy each pro-
ducing the same product, with total demand equal 2 units of the product. Suppose initially that
all three businesses have an equal share of two-thirds. In a boom demand becomes 2.5. Since
there are costs to establishing new business relationships, the customers of each business stick
with them and simply demand more. There is no uncertainty. In a recession, in contrast, de-
mand becomes 2x, where x Ç 1. Assume that one of the businesses goes under and business
relations are severed. The existing customers at the two remaining businesses now demand 2
3x
each. What happens to the customers whose preferred business partner vanished? Let us as-
sume there is some uncertainty over where they are going to go, as in a location model where






, i.e. one business gets all the free customers, on the other extreme






where even in the most equal distribution both businesses are worse off than before, but with
an unequal split one business might even come out better than before in this recession. The
important point is this: there is an intrinsic uncertainty due to recessions, because business
structures and practices have to be re-arranged.29
Table7showsthatalmostallNBERrecessionswereperiodsofhighuncertaintywhetheritis
measured as business uncertainty from survey data, the corporate bond spread as in Gilchrist,
Yankov and Zakrajsek (2009), or stock market volatility as in Bloom (2009). We deﬁne high un-
certainty events as months when either uncertainty measure was one standard deviation above
its time series average. But there is also a considerable fraction of months, close to 10 per-
28For the SVAR with the corporate bond spread the contribution of the long-run innovation to the 1M, 3M, 6M,
1Y, 2Y, 5Y-ahead forecast error variance is 51%, 55%, 53%, 54%, 61%, 63%, respectively.
29It is beyond the scope of this paper to fully ﬂash out a model of intrinsic uncertainty as a result of bad ﬁrst
moment shocks, we leave this for future research.
27cent, where uncertainty was high but the economy not in a recession. This is at least suggestive
evidence that uncertainty is a concomitant factor of bad economic times rather than a causal
factor for them.
Table 7: RELATION BETWEEN NBER RECESSIONS AND HIGH UNCERTAINTY DATES
Uncertainty Measure High Uncertainty High Uncertainty
In Recessions Outside of Recessions
UncertaintyBOS 7 out of 7 8.5%
Corporate Bond Spread 6 out of 8 11.2%
Stock Market Volatility 7 out of 7 8.3%
Notes: UncertaintyBOS refers to the BOS uncertainty measure, based on Q 1. For ‘Corporate Bond Spread’ see
notes to Figure 11. ‘Stock Market Volatility’ refers to the stock market volatility measure used in Bloom (2009),
which until 1986 is realized monthly stock return volatility, and thereafter an implied volatility index. For each
uncertainty proxy we construct a high uncertainty dummy, setting it unity, when the value exceeds the time series
average by one standard deviation (this is similar to Bloom’s (2009) uncertainty index construction). In the ﬁrst
column we report how many post 1960 recessions coincide with high uncertainty events. We do not have BOS or
stock market volatility data available for the 1961 recession. There are no high corporate bond spread-uncertainty
eventsduringthe1961andthe1991recessions. Inthesecondcolumnwereportthefractionofmonthswherehigh
uncertainty events occur outside of NBER recessions.
5 Final Remarks
Using two different measures of business uncertainty from high-frequency, sectoral business
surveys in an agnostic structural vector autoregressions framework we ﬁnd that positive in-
novations to sectoral business uncertainty have protracted negative implications for sectoral
economic activity much in the same way as negative sectoral business conﬁdence shocks have.
Shutting down these long-run implications leaves little signiﬁcant impact on economic activ-
ity. We argue that these results are inconsistent with the “wait-and-see”-channel recently advo-
cated in the literature. Rather, we ﬁnd that negative long-run shocks lead to high uncertainty
events. While we leave open the possibility that uncertainty ﬂuctuations are important au-
tonomous economic shocks with long-run implications, we interpret our ﬁndings as reﬂecting
the fact that uncertainty is a concomitant phenomenon of negative ﬁrst moments events in the
economy. Bad times breed uncertainty.
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30A Appendix - A Simple Model
To illustrate the relationship between such concepts as disagreement, uncertainty and cross-
sectional variance, we use the following simple two-period model: tomorrow’s business sit-
uation of ﬁrms is unknown today, it can move into three directions. Business situations can
improve (Å1), stay the same (0) or deteriorate (¡1). For each ﬁrm, nature draws the change
in business situation from the following probability distribution: [0.5¤(1¡p),p,0.5¤(1¡p)],
which is assumed to be known to the ﬁrms. The cross-sectional variance of the future business
situation is obviously (1¡p), a decreasing function of p. Furthermore, we assume that busi-
nesses receive a signal about the change in their business situation, with a structure illustrated
in Table 8. For instance, if tomorrow’s true state is Å1, the signal can be Å1 (with probability q)
and 0 with probability (1¡q). q thus measures the informativeness of the signal.
Table 8: A SIMPLE TWO-PERIOD MODEL OF FIRMS’ BUSINESS SITUATIONS
State Tomorrow
0.5¤(1¡p) . # p & (1¡p)¤0.5
+1 0 -1
q . & (1¡q) 0.5¤(1¡q) . q # & (1¡q)¤0.5 (1¡q) . & q
+1 0 +1 0 -1 0 -1
Signal
UsingBayes’Lawwecancomputetheprobabilitiesofthetruestate, conditionalonasignal:
1. (a) Prob(state Æ1jsignal Æ1)Æ
q¤0.5¤(1¡p)
q¤0.5¤(1¡p)Å0.5¤(1¡q)¤p
(b) Prob(state Æ0jsignal Æ1)Æ
0.5¤(1¡q)¤p
q¤0.5¤(1¡p)Å0.5¤(1¡q)¤p
(c) Prob(state Æ¡1jsignal Æ1)Æ0
2. (a) Prob(state Æ1jsignal Æ0)Æ
(1¡q)¤0.5¤(1¡p)
(1¡q)¤0.5¤(1¡p)Åq¤pÅ(1¡q)¤0.5¤(1¡p)
(b) Prob(state Æ0jsignal Æ0)Æ
q¤p
(1¡q)¤0.5¤(1¡p)Åq¤pÅ(1¡q)¤0.5¤(1¡p)
(c) Prob(state Æ¡1jsignal Æ0)Æ
(1¡q)¤0.5¤(1¡p)
(1¡q)¤0.5¤(1¡p)Åq¤pÅ(1¡q)¤0.5¤(1¡p)
3. (a) Prob(state Æ1jsignal Æ¡1)Æ0
(b) Prob(state Æ0jsignal Æ¡1)Æ
0.5¤(1¡q)¤p
q¤0.5¤(1¡p)Å0.5¤(1¡q)¤p
(c) Prob(state Æ¡1jsignal Æ¡1)Æ
q¤0.5¤(1¡p)
q¤0.5¤(1¡p)Å0.5¤(1¡q)¤p
31From these conditional probabilities, conditional expectations and variances can be com-
puted. And these, in turn, allow us to calculate 1) the variance of the conditional expectations
over the change in business situations, which is a measure of disagreement; and 2) the average
conditional variance over the change in the business situation of a ﬁrm, which is a measure of
the average (subjective) uncertainty in the population of ﬁrms.
We begin with the case of perfectly informative signals: q Æ1. In this case, obviously, survey
disagreement moves one for one with the variance of tomorrow’s state, but ﬁrms do not expe-
rience any subjective uncertainty about the change in their business situation. With q Æ 1 and
in a two period set up disagreement and uncertainty do not comove. The fact that we ﬁnd sub-
stantial forecast errors in the IFO-BCS suggests that this extreme case may not be realistic. But
even if we assumed q Æ 1 and thus certainty for the immediate future, higher disagreement
today indicates a higher cross-sectional variance in business situations tomorrow and thus
higher uncertainty about business situations for periods beyond the immediate future, as long
asthevarianceoffutureinnovationstothebusinesssituationofﬁrmshassomepersistencebe-
yond the immediate period and signals are not perfectly informative about this farther future.









, showing that uncertainty is very persistent.
Figure 12: Autocorrelograms of Various Uncertainty Measures
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Q 4 and Q 5, see Section 3.3.
32Next, we look at the cases with imperfectly informative signals, i.e. q Ç1. We know from the
conditional variance decomposition formula that if the variance of tomorrow’s state increases
either the variance of the conditional expectations over tomorrow’s state (disagreement) or the
average conditional variance over tomorrow’s state (average subjective uncertainty) has to in-
crease, both may increase. The following Figure 13 shows for various levels of the signal pre-
cision, q, that the latter is indeed the case in this model. The actual cross-sectional variance
of tomorrow’s state is given by the black solid line, the variance of the conditional expectations
over tomorrow’s state (disagreement) by the blue dashed line and the average conditional vari-
ance over tomorrow’s state (subjective uncertainty) by the red dotted line.
Figure 13: Cross-sectional Variance, Disagreement and Uncertainty
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Finally, in order to translate the continuous disagreement measure – the variance of the
conditional expectations over the change in business situations – into discrete disagreement
in survey answers, where only [¡1,0,1] as an answer are possible, we assume that if the ﬁrm
receives zero as a signal, it will answer zero, simply because the conditional expectation is zero
in this case (by the symmetry of the model). Furthermore, if it receives a signal equal to 1, the
probability of answering 1 in the survey equals the conditional expectation, which ranges from
1(if p Æ0)to0(if p Æ1). Thismeans, theclosertheconditionalexpectationistounity, themore
likely ﬁrms are going to respond with 1 in the survey. Symmetrically for the case of receiving a
signal that equals ¡1. With these assumptions, the variance of the survey answers is given by:





This discretized version of disagreement is also shown in Figure 13, by the green dashed-
dotted line. It follows closely the continuous disagreement measure. Notice that for interme-
diate signal qualities, both disagreement and uncertainty move in the same direction as the
variance of the state tomorrow. In particular for high values of p subjective uncertainty varies a
lot with the cross-sectional variance of the change in business situations. If the signal was such
that it left everybody with the same conditional expectation (q Æ 0), then of course disagree-
ment would always be zero. Only the subjective uncertainty would then be affected.
B Appendix-ThirdFEDDistrictBusinessOutlookSurvey(BOS)
B.1 Additional BOS Questions
Q 6 “Company Business Indicators: Shipments six months from now vs. [CURRENT MONTH]:
decrease, no change, increase?”
Q 7 “Company Business Indicators: Number of Employees six months from now vs. [CURRENT
MONTH]: decrease, no change, increase?”
Q 8 “CompanyBusinessIndicators: AverageEmployeeWorkweeksixmonthsfromnowvs. [CUR-
RENT MONTH]: decrease, no change, increase?”
Q 9 “Company Business Indicators: Shipments [LAST MONTH] vs. [CURRENT MONTH]: de-
crease, no change, increase?”
Q 10 “Company Business Indicators: Average Employee Workweek [LAST MONTH] vs. [CUR-
RENT MONTH]: decrease, no change, increase?”
34B.2 Additional Information on BOS Variables
Table 9: COMPARISON OF BOS-Activityt VARIABLES AND OFFICIAL STATISTICS
General Conditions Shipments Employment
BLS Monthly Sect. & Regio. Empl. 0.54 0.60 0.63
Philadelphia FED Coincident Index 0.71 0.68 0.60
NIPA Yearly Sect. & Regio. Prod. 0.39 0.41 -
Notes: This table compares BOS-Activityt Variables, based, in column order, on Q 2, Q 9 and Q 3, with three
different measures of sectoral and regional activity measures from ofﬁcial statistics (in row order): ‘BLS Monthly
Sect. & Regio. Empl.’ refers to the sum of the seasonally adjusted monthly manufacturing employment series for
Pennsylvania,DelawareandNewJersey,availablefromtheBLSfrom1990on. ‘PhiladelphiaFEDCoincidentIndex’
refers to the GDP-weighted sum of the Philadelphia FED Coincident Indices for Pennsylvania, Delaware and New
Jersey(noticethatthisindexisregionally, butnotsectorallycoincidingwiththecoverageoftheBOS).Itisavailable
from1979on. ‘NIPAYearlySect. &Regio. Prod.’ referstotheGDP-weightedsumoftheyearlyNIPAquantityindices
for the manufacturing sector for Pennsylvania, Delaware and New Jersey.
Figure 14: BOS - Dynamic Cross-Correlations BetweenConf idencet and ¢ Activityt


















Notes: The upper panel is based on Q 1 and Q 2. The lower panel is based on Q 6 and Q 9. The order is such that
Conf idencet leads ¢ Activityt towards the right.
35B.3 Additional BOS Results
This appendix provides various robustness checks to the results in Section 4.1. Figure 15 shows
that the ordering between uncertainty and activity variables is irrelevant for the result that un-
certainty innovations in two-variable SVARs trigger prolonged declines in sectoral economic
activity. Figures 16 and 17 vary the economic activity variable used in our baseline two-variable
SVAR, while keeping General Conditions-UncertaintyBOS
t (based on Q 1) as the uncertainty
measure: the BOS shipments, employment and workhours based activity indices, and labor
productivity. Figures 18 to 20, in turn, vary the uncertainty measure used: an indicator variable
for high uncertainty, an entropy-based uncertainty measure and uncertainty measures derived
from other expectation questions in the BOS.
Figure 15: Uncertainty Innovation on Manufacturing Production - Reverse Ordering















Notes: The IRF is based on a two-variable SVAR with General Conditions-UncertaintyBOS
t (based on Q 1 of the
BOS) ordered second and 12 lags. Manufacturing production is the natural logarithm of the (seasonally adjusted)
monthly manufacturing production index from the OECD main economic indicators. All conﬁdence bands are at
the 95% signiﬁcance level using Kilian’s (1998) bias-corrected bootstrap.
36Figure 16: Uncertainty Innovations on Various BOS Activity Indices
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BOS Workhours Activity Index
Notes: see notes to Figure 15. Uncertainty is ordered ﬁrst. The activity indices for the three panels are based on
Q 9, Q 3 and Q 10, respectively.
37Figure 17: Uncertainty Innovation on Manufacturing Labor Productivity














Notes: see notes to Figure 15. Uncertainty is ordered ﬁrst. Labor productivity is the log-difference between the
(seasonally adjusted) monthly manufacturing production index from the OECD main economic indicators and
the (seasonally adjusted) monthly manufacturing total hours series, which is itself based on the manufacturing
employment and weekly hours per worker series from the BLS-CES data base.
38Figure 18: Uncertainty Innovation (Indicator Variable) on Manufacturing Production
















Notes: see notes to Figure 15. The uncertainty variable here is an indicator variable that takes on a value of one, if
GeneralConditions-UncertaintyBOS
t ,themeasureofuncertaintywhichisbasedonQ1,isonestandarddeviation
above its mean, and zero otherwise. There are 60 high-uncertainty observations, or about 12% of the sample.
Models with non-convexities typically predict that it is large increases in uncertainty that matter, not the frequent
increases and decreases observed in most months. That is why we follow Bloom (2009) and construct such an
uncertainty indicator. Using indicator variables in a VAR analysis is similar to the “event study” identiﬁcations, for
example, in Ramey and Shapiro (1998).
39Figure 19: Uncertainty Innovation on Manufacturing Production - Entropy







Notes: see notes to Figure 15. Uncertainty is ordered ﬁrst. It is measured as
Uncertainty
Entrop
t ´ Fract(Increase)log(1/Fract(Increase)) Å Fract(Decrease)log(1/Fract(Decrease)) Å
Fract(Neutral)log(1/Fract(Neutral)).
Figure 20: Uncertainty Innovations from Other BOS Activity Indices







BOS Shipments Activity Index







BOS Employment Activity Index







BOS Workhours Activity Index
Notes: see notes to Figure 15. The uncertainty variables for the three panels are based on Q 6, Q 7 and Q 8, respec-
tively. The activity indices for the three panels are based on Q 9, Q 3 and Q 10. Uncertainty is ordered ﬁrst.
40C Appendix - IFO Business Climate Survey (IFO-BCS)
C.1 Original German IFO-BCS Questions
Q 11 “Erwartungen für die nächsten 3 Monate: Unsere inländische Produktionstätigkeit – ohne
BerücksichtigungunterschiedlicherMonatslängenundsaisonalerSchwankungen–bezüglichXY
wird voraussichtlich: steigen, etwa gleich bleiben, abnehmen.”
Q 12 “Tendenzen im vorangegangenen Monat: Unsere inländische Produktionstätigkeit – ohne
BerücksichtigungunterschiedlicherMonatslängenundsaisonalerSchwankungen–bezüglichXY
ist: gestiegen, etwa gleich geblieben, gesunken.”
C.2 The IFO-BCS Uncertainty Measures
Figure 21: Variance Decomposition of (UncertaintyIFO
t )2















Notes: ‘Total Variance’ refers to (UncertaintyIFO
t )2. ‘Within-Variance’ is the cross-sectional average of the
industry analogs of (UncertaintyIFO
t )2 for the following 13 manufacturing industries: transportation equip-
ment (Fahrzeugbau), machinery and equipment (Maschinenbau), metal products (Metallerzeugung), other non-
metallic mineral products (Glas, Keramik, Verarbeitung von Steinen und Erden), rubber and plastic products
(Gummi und Kunststoff), chemical products (Chemische Industrie), electrical and optical equipment (Elektrotech-
nik,FeinmechanikundOptik),pulp,paper,publishingandprinting(Papier,Verlage,Druck),furnitureandjewelery
(Möbel und Schmuck), cork and wood products except furniture (Holz ohne Möbel), leather (Leder), textiles and
textile products (Textil und Bekleidung), food, beverages and tobacco (Ernährung und Tabak). We leave out the
oil industry, because it has only very few observations. ‘Between-Variance’ refers to the cross-sectional variance of
the industry analogs of (Conf idenceIFO
t ).







































and standardized by their standard deviation. Their correlation is 0.73. The lower panel shows the quarterly aver-





time series, demeaned and standardized by their
standard deviation. Their correlation is 0.77.
42Table 10: CYCLICAL PROPERTIES OF Uncertaintyt AND Uncertainty
f e







Industry Own Activityt Activityt Own Activityt Activityt
Transp. Equipment -0.38 -0.39 -0.17 -0.10
Machinery and Equipment -0.43 -0.48 -0.24 -0.29
Metal Products -0.51 -0.56 -0.34 -0.42
Other non-metal. Products -0.53 -0.41 -0.29 -0.36
Rubber and Plastic -0.54 -0.50 -0.34 -0.30
Chemical Products -0.19 -0.37 -0.29 -0.42
Elect. & Opt. Equipment -0.50 -0.48 -0.43 -0.39
Paper and Publishing -0.64 -0.55 -0.56 -0.49
Furniture and Jewelery -0.45 -0.31 -0.32 -0.17
Cork and Wood Products -0.53 -0.46 -0.40 -0.35
Leather -0.26 -0.14 -0.14 -0.25
Textile Products -0.70 -0.50 -0.51 -0.37
Food and Tobacco -0.18 -0.29 -0.17 -0.26
Notes: See notes to Table 3 and Figure 21. ‘Own Activityt’ refers to the industry-speciﬁc analog of the activity
variable, based on Q 5. ‘Activityt’ refers to the overall activity measure, based on Q 5
43D Appendix-SmallBusinessEconomicsTrendsSurvey(SBETS)
The Small Business Economic Trends Survey (SBETS) is a monthly survey conducted by the Na-
tional Foundation of Independent Businesses (NFIB) which focuses on small companies across
the U.S. and across all sectors. Thus the SBETS is a good complement to the BOS which focuses
on larger manufacturing ﬁrms in the Third FED District. To the extent that the SVAR results are
similar this appendix lends additional support to our ﬁndings. The SBETS’s monthly part starts
in 1986. The survey on a quarterly basis is available since the mid 1970s. We prefer the highest
possible frequency to give the “wait-and-see”-dynamics the best possible chance to appear in
the data. None of our results depend on that choice of frequency. In terms of participation, the
October 2009 issue of the SBETS (see Dunkelberg and Wade, 2009) reports that from January
2004 to December 2006 roughly 500 business owners responded, and that the number has sub-
sequently increased to approximately 750.30 Almost 25% of respondents are in the retail sector,
20% in construction and 15% in manufacturing, followed by services, which ranges well above
10%. All other one-digit sectors have a single digit representation fraction. In terms of ﬁrm size,
the sample contains much smaller enterprises than the BOS: the modal bin for the number of
employees31 is "three to ﬁve", to which over 25% of respondents belong, followed by the "six to
nine"-category with roughly 20%. The highest category is "forty or more", which contains just
under 10% of ﬁrms.32
We use three questions from the SBETS. The conﬁdence and uncertainty indices are based
on a question about general business conditions just like in the BOS:33
Q 13 “About the economy in general, do you think that six months from now general business
conditions will be better than they are now, about the same, or worse?: 1 Much better, 2 Some-
what better, 3 About the same, 4 Somewhat worse, 5 Much worse, 6 Don’t know. ”
OneadvantageofthisquestionoveritsBOSversionisthatitisslightlymorenuancedinthat
it allows for two "increase"- and two "decrease"-categories. We quantify the extreme categories
with ¡2 and 2, respectively. To measure activity in the SBETS we use:
Q 14 “Duringthelastcalendarquarter, wasyourdollarsalesvolumehigher, lower, oraboutthe
same as it was for the quarter before? 1 Much higher 2 Higher 3 About the same, 4 Lower 5
Much lower. ”
30The participation in the quarterly survey is higher, 1200 on average before January 2007 and 1750 thereafter.
31This includes full- and part-time employees.
32For this and more details, see Dunkelberg and Wade (2009).
33The box and the bold font are also used in the original.
44And as with the BOS we construct a turnover index for employment from an actual employ-
ment change question:
Q 15 “During the last three months, did the total number of employees in your ﬁrm increase,
decrease or stay about the same? 1 Increased 2 Decreased 3 Stayed the same. ”
Figure 23 displays the analog of Figure 3 in Section 4.1. Both negative business conﬁdence
innovationsandpositivebusinessuncertaintyinnovationsleadtolongandprotractednegative
reactions of the economic activity of small ﬁrms. Similarly to the BOS, there is little or no high-
frequency impact followed by a strong rebound of economic activity.
Figure 23: Uncertainty Innovations on SBETS Sales Activity Index



















Notes: Conﬁdence and uncertainty are based on Q 13. The activity variable is based on Q 14. The upper panel is
based on a two-variable SVAR with conﬁdence ordered ﬁrst, then activity. It displays the response of the SBETS
Sales Activity Index to a negative conﬁdence innovation. The lower panel is based on a two-variable SVAR with
uncertainty ordered ﬁrst, then activity. It displays the response of the SBETS Sales Activity Index to a positive
uncertainty innovation.
Figure 24 is similar to Figure 5 from the BOS. It shows the impulse response of the job
turnovermeasuretoaninnovationtouncertainty. Asbefore,totheextenttowhichjobturnover
reacts to business uncertainty at all, it rises (at least the point estimate), which is inconsistent
with “wait-and-see”-theories of uncertainty shocks.
45Figure 24: Uncertainty Innovation on SBETS Job Turnover Index
















Notes: see notes to Figure 23. The IRF is based on a two-variable SVAR with uncertainty ordered ﬁrst and then job
turnover. Job turnover is based on Q 15.
Finally, Figure 25 and Table 11 display the analogs of Figure 8 and Table 5 in Section 4.1.
There is little, albeit compared to the BOS somewhat larger impact of uncertainty innovations
to either sectoral economic activity or the economy-wide unemployment rate. There is again
some impact of the long-run innovations on the uncertainty index.


























































Notes: see notestoFigure23. The unemploymentrate isthe (seasonally adjusted)monthly civilianunemployment
rate from the BLS. The uncertainty innovation and the conventional short-run shock are identiﬁed as shocks that
do not impact manufacturing production in the long-run. The conventional short-run shock is identiﬁed as the
innovation that does not affect the uncertainty index on impact.
Table 11: FORECAST ERROR VARIANCE DECOMPOSITION - SBETS
Shock 1M 3M 6M 1Y 2Y 5Y
Long-run 54% 45% 36% 34% 35% 46%
Activity Uncertainty 5% 1% 5% 12% 26% 30%
Short-run 41% 54% 60% 54% 39% 24%
Long-run 28% 30% 34% 32% 28% 24%
Uncertainty Uncertainty 72% 69% 65% 65% 63% 61%
Short-run 0% 2% 1% 3% 10% 15%
Long-run 17% 8% 3% 3% 7% 9%
Unemployment Rate Uncertainty 11% 17% 25% 40% 51% 54%
Short-run 72% 75% 72% 58% 42% 37%
Notes: see notes to Figure 25
47E Appendix-CorporateBondSpreadsandStockMarketVolatil-
ity
Figure 26: Uncertainty Innovations on (Manufacturing) Production



















Notes: The ‘Stock Market Volatility’ IRF is a replication of Figure 2 in Bloom (2009), with the exception that we
use 95% conﬁdence bands. It shows the response of U.S. industrial production with respect to a stock market
volatilityshock. Thevariablesintheestimationorderarelog(S&P500stockmarketindex), astock-marketvolatility
indicator, Federal Funds Rate, log(average hourly earnings), log(consumer price index), hours, log(employment),
and log(industrial production). All variables are Hodrick-Prescott (HP) detrended (¸ = 129,600). The main stock-
market volatility indicator is constructed to take a value 1 for a month with particularly high volatility, see Bloom
(2009) for details. The ‘Corporate Bond Spread’ IRF is the analog of the impulse response in the lower panel of
Figure 1 for an uncertainty measure based on corporate bond spreads as in Gilchrist, Yankov and Zakrajsek (2009).
‘Corporate Bond Spread’ refers to the spread of the 30 year Baa corporate bond index over the 30 year treasury
bond. Where the 30 year treasury bond was missing we used the 20 year bond. Data source for the bond data is
the Federal Reserve Board. The corresponding activity measure is total industrial production. UncertaintyBOS
t
is based on General Conditions-UncertaintyBOS
t , i.e. Q 1. The corresponding activity measure is manufacturing
industrial production.
48